CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927 — Page 157

171

the imminence of danger to Shanghai; that conversations

in regard to military reinforcements on any serious

scale would be premature; and that for the moment it was

sufficient to exchange information.

The effect of this information on the disposi-

tions approved by the Cabinet for reinforcing Shanghai was

then discussed at some length. On the one hand was

represented the risk that if orders were issued to units,

whether in this country or in India, the whole of the

steps we were prepared to take (alone if the Japanese

refused to co-operate) in order to protect our interests

at Shanghai, would become public property, and the

Japanese might shy off and refuse that co-operation which

the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff Committee so earnestly

desired. On the other hand, owing to the time required for

reinforcements to reach Shanghai from India or the

Mediterranean or from home, delay was dangerous. In this

connection attention vas drawn to the telegram from the

naval Commander-in-Chief of January 12th, in which he

recommended (with the approval of the Consul-General at

Shanghai) the immediate despatch of a Division.

agreed

After careful consideration the Conference

(a) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

should definitely clear up the situation with the

Japanese Goverment by sending the telegram attached

in Appendix I. explaining the considerations of time.

and space which (more especially in the absence of

knowledge as to the intentions of the Japanese

Government) compel the British Government to take

decisions before matters appear urgent to the Japane se

Government; and pressing for a reply within 48 hours

regarding Japanese intentions:

(b) That no action should be taken to delay the

provision of the necessary shipping transport for the

scheme of reinforcements approved by the Cabinet,

but